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Preface 
This paper was prepared while the author was a participant of the "Young Scientist's 
Summer Program (YSSP)" at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) in Laxenburg during the summer of 1991. It was completed just before, on 
August 19, 1991, conservative forces led by G.Yanaev attempted to oust USSR President 
M.Gorbachev in a coup. 
After the eventual failure of this coup, the political and economic developments in the 
Soviet Union became even more dynamic: a much faster fiscal disintegration is one of 
them. In fact, it seems questionable in what sense the Soviet Union is still a fiscal entity, 
thus justifiably allowing the use of concepts of a Theory of Fiscal Federalism, in which the 
following analysis is cast: an essential element of any federal system is that a power exists 
which can effectively limit decision-making power on lower hierarchical government levels. 
In the case of non-compliance with the rules laid down in the constitution, the former 
can coerce the latter into adhering to the rules. Certainly after the coup, and probably 
already before, the central government of the USSR is very much in doubt of representing 
a political power which could exert the necessary coercion to enforce its rules. 
The sequence of reform proposals mirrors the steady loss of power of the federal gov- 
ernment in the Soviet Union. From Gorbachev's rejection in the fall 1990 of the so-called 
"500 Day Plan" prepared by a group of economists around S. Shatalin, partly because 
it conceded to Union republics alone the authority to tax, the federal government being 
financed by fixed quotas on the republic's revenues over the agreement on a new draft 
Union Treaty in April 1991, which was already less biased towards the center, to the latest 
so-called "Yavlinsky Plan" of September 5, 1991'--economic reform proposals made by 
the Union level systematically lag behind the realities in the Soviet Union. With regard 
to fiscal matters, the "Yavlinsky Plan" envisages essentially what was the center's main 
objection to the "500 Day Planv-giving the right to  tax exclusively to Union republics. 
And, it is doubtful today whether even a federation that loose is possible. If, thus, 
fiscal-economically the Soviet Union do.es not exist any more, is it mistaken to interpret 
developments in the fiscal system there in the light of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism? 
The exact characterization of the political system in the former Soviet Union is not 
the heart of this paper. Rather, this paper singles out some mechanisms which are a,t 
work in the devolving fiscal system in the Soviet Union. To assess their relevance now, in 
post-coup times, one should think of a continuum of possible solutions between a perfectly 
centralized fiscal system, as had been prevailing until 1987, to a perfectly decentralized 
fiscal system in which a Soviet fiscal entity has ceased to  exist. 
Take one example: as discussed below, the fact that, before the coup, Union republics 
transferred less than 40% of tax revenue in 1991 which was assigned to  the central govern- 
ment can be viewed, in terms of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism, as "free-rider" behavior 
on the republics part. As it turns out, since the failed coup, republican transfers to the 
center were close to  zero. 
'See Yavlinsky (1991), esp. Article 19-25, p.22f. 
Assume it is no longer meaningful to  refer to  a central government because now its 
power is perfectly dismantled. Considering the (ex-)republics as independent economies, 
as long as there are spatial spillovers creating externalities among the (ex-)republics, the 
issue is now one of "International Policy Coordination", in which a leading issue is again 
free-rider behavior. 
This shows that mechanisms which were fiscally relevant up to August 1991 do not 
necessarily lose their importance in post-coup t imes-on the contrary, they might gain 
importance. If the struggle for fiscal power between the center and the republics is now 
over in the sense that fiscal power of the center is only what the republics want it to  be, 
problems which relied on that,  like the incentive implications for state enterprises which 
are torn between both subnational and central ministries, will be diminished. By the same 
token, however, inter- (ex-)republican fiscal relations on the one hand, and intra-republican 
relations on'  the other, and their potential inefficiencies (e.g., unstable tax competition 
between (ex-)republics, or state enterprises now under the sole, but closer surveillance, of 
subnational fiscal authorities, respectively) gain importance.2 
Taken together, the analysis of the devolving Soviet fiscal system portrays many ele- 
ments which are bound to play a major role also for the fiscal relations of politically inde- 
pendent (ex-)republics. Although some aspects will vanish with independent economies, 
others have emerged already in the transformation of the centralized to  a federalistic 
Soviet fiscal system, which is what this paper is dealing with. 
'It is worth noting that originally, the Theory of Fiscal Federalism dealt primarily with inefficiencies 
arising from lower-level behavior, not from competition among national and subnational levels. 
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SOVIET UNION AND 
REPUBLICS: 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
AND THE THEORY OF FISCAL 
FEDERALISM 
Wolfgang Keller 
The Soviet Union is disintegrating rapidly. Not only the Union republics seek more 
independence from the center, but also far lower levels of the Soviet state push for it: 
even some districts of Moscow and Leningrad have declared their "sovereignty" .4 
While nowadays analyses of the Eastern European economies in transition are abun- 
dant, comprehensive accounts of the state and the impact of disintegration in some of 
these economies are rare. So the medium term scenario of the "Study of the Soviet Econ- 
omy" by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development (EBRD), (IMF et.al.), published in February 1991, assume 
that 
the republics of the USSR will maintain an all-union market, including an 
absence of trade barriers between republics; a common currency and exchange 
rate, and therefore a common monetary policy; a common external tariff; and 
an agreed division of responsibilities for taxation and expenditures at different 
levels of government5 
which is, already at the time of writing (August 1991), to  a varying degree different from 
what one can see. The intention in this paper, therefore, is to analyze this drive towards 
decentralization and disintegration. Decentralization is referred to as being a step towards 
disintegration. On the contrary, the economic theory of integration allows that even very 
decentralized systems are perfectly integrated since it is factor mobility and the absence 
of trade distortions that counts. However, the present usage reflects the fact that-as 
it is the case in the Soviet Union today--often decentralization and disintegration go 
hand-in-hand. 
The analysis is short-run orientated, focuses on the fiscal system, and is motivated by 
the implications of disintegration for further transition to a market economy: no account 
of the disintegration in the Soviet economy can ignore its fiscal system, since it is here- 
especially the question of tax authority-where there are some of the major disagreements 
3I would like to thank P. Aven, S .  Damberger, J .  Gacs, A. Illarionov, I .  Karimov, M.J.  Peck, T. 
Richardson, C. Schneider and A. Vedev for helpful comments. All remaining errors are the author's. 
4Alexashenko (1990), p.36. 
51MF et.al. (1991), Vo1.3, p.344. 
between the federal government on the one hand, and the Union republics governments 
on the other.6 In fact, problems of lax competence have been the major blocking stone 
for the Soviet President Gorbachev to present a new Union Treaty at the London Summit, 
of the so-called G-7 countries in July 1991. 
The connection to the transition to a market system stems from the fact that any 
development leading to a higher budget deficit will postpone, if not bring to a complete 
standstill, further progress of reform in the Soviet Union: in a market economy, inflation- 
ary expectations will prevail-as experiences with hyperinflation in Latin America have 
shown-as long as the budget deficit in an economy is substantial, since it will eventually 
be financed by taking resort to the printing press. In a planned economy, with controlled 
prices, there is also the possibility of a deepening crisis of goods shortages. If it is not 
possible to stabilize public finances, the USSR will face either accelerating inflation, or 
more shortages at controlled prices, or a mixture of both. It is impossible to make progress 
towards a market economy under such conditions.' 
The analysis is short-run oriented since reference is made to the situation in the Soviet 
Union before the (eventually failed) military coup of August 19, 1991. The devolving 
fiscal system of the Soviet Union is the main interest. Perspectives on the likely fiscal 
performance of fiscally totally independent republics on the area of the (former?) USSR 
were not central to this investigation, but some of the stylized mechanisms stressed below 
are prevalent today even more than before August 1991. 
To emphasize the fiscal system does not mean to deny the importance of other fac- 
tors feeding the Soviet deficit which preceded the move towards fiscal decentralization, 
especially the partial liberalization of state enterprises, with the so-called "Enterprise 
Self-Management,"' and others which are unrelated to it, in particular the system of 
price subsidies between wholesale and retail prices. Price subsidies accounted 1989 with 
97.6 billion rubles for 20% of all budgetary e ~ ~ e n d i t u r e . ~  
In this paper, however, it is argued that the recent development towards a decentral- 
ization of fiscal decision-making power in the Soviet Union is central in explaining the 
dramatic widening of the budget deficit in the years 1990 and 1991. 
The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1I.A describes the Soviet fiscal system of pre-1987,'0 which serves as a starting 
point for this analysis. In Section 1I.B an overview is given of the strong tendency towards 
fiscal decentralization since then. 
In the following. Section 111, the Theory of Economic Federalism is used as the bench- 
mark of this analysis. Two approaches are distinguished: to begin with, in Section III.B, 
the normative approach is applied, primarily concerned with questions of the optimal 
assignment of public functions in a federal system. As a first step the sta,ge is set using 
mainly concepts of public finance theory. Then the Soviet fiscal decentralization is ex- 
amined more closely and interpreted in terms of the theory outlined. The bottom line of 
the argument is the identification of a number of consequences of decentralization just for 
which the theory calls for centralization." 
' ~ o s t  issues concern these two. In some cases we refer to subnational levels which include Union 
republics, autonomous republics, and local governments, most importantly. 
7See also IMF, et.al. (1991), Vo1.3, p.357f. 
'See the complementarity of these developments in Sections II.A.l and III.C.2.3. Discretion, Corrup- 
tion and Soft-Budget. 
gAven (1991), p.12. 
lountil  1987 the republics remained relatively passive, expecting the reform to  come from the center. 
Also in 1987 falls the "Law on State Enterprises". 
"More general, it calls for provision a t  a higher hierarchical level; see footnote 66. 
This helps in clarifying the causes of the suboptimal current situation. The second 
way of analyzing a fiscal system is decidedly positive. Again, the Soviet Union is looked at 
as a federal system, but this time close attention is paid to  the behavior of the economic 
agents who are representing the government block. Thus, in Section III.C, the focus will 
be on well-known concepts of public choice theory to  single out more consequences, and 
their impact, of the fiscal decentralization in the Soviet Union. A conclusion summarizes 
the findings. 
11. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET FIS- 
CAL SYSTEM 
A. The Soviet Fiscal System until 198712 
1. The System as a Part of a Centrally Planned Economy 
In the Soviet Union the fiscal system differed fundamentally from that of a Western 
economy. This is because the prime coordination mechanism is the plan, instead of prices. 
The main planning tool in the centrally planned system was the national plan, prepared 
by Gosplan, the central planning agency. Here the allocation of resources was laid down. 
Starting from the quantity targets of the national plan, the financial plan of the economy 
had to be made compatible with its input-output system. This was done primarily by the 
USSR Ministry of Finance, who acted as fiscal agent of the planning agency, mobilizing 
and transferring financial resources as well as auditing state enterprises to carry out the 
plan. Coordination among the two was poor, however. And although fiscal tools and the 
budget were used for purposes of resource allocation, this was done mainly through the 
actual transfer of resources rather than via monetary signals and levers. 
In this system, the allocative function13 of public finance is largely redundant since 
it is the plan which allocates resources between sectors and activities. The government 
budget is seen merely as a means of exercising financial control, to  ensure that physical 
production targets are met. 
The distribution function is also redundant since it is the central planning mechanism 
which determines wage differentials, and private ownership of wealth is insignificant. The 
fiscal system has no significant role in .the stabilization of the economy either since the 
objectives of full-employment, price stability, and external balance are all achieved by 
administrative fiat. 
Therefore, the state budget, the tax system and government expenditure are best seen 
as additional levers to support the planning mechanism and improve control over state 
enterprises. Consequently, fiscal policy plays a passive role in the sense that government 
finances are entirely subordinate to  the economic plan. 
2. Major Budgetary Revenue Sources and Revenue Sharing 
Arrangements 
In a centrally planned economy, the tax collecting mechanism is largely implicit: enter- 
prises are owned and controlled by the central government. Their surpluses are revenue 
12This very brief overview is based on Alexashenko (1990), Aven/Alexashenko (1991), Bahry (1987), 
IMF, et.al. (1991), Knight/Waxman (1991), Kopits (1991), McKinnon (1990) and Newcity (1986). 
13See Musgrave/Musgrave (1973) for the following distinction. 
in the fiscal sense. Also in the Soviet Union, the main budget source was enterprise 
income-rather than taxes, which is what it has been called for simplicity. Explicit tax 
rates did not exist, but the amount to be transferred for an enterprise was pre-determined 
by fixing wholesale and retail prices of the goods. 
The Soviet state budget relied primarily on five revenue sources. These were transfers 
from enterprises, turnover taxes, income from foreign trade, taxes on individuals, and 
other sources. See Table 1. 
Table 1: Structure of Revenues of the Soviet State Budget, 1971-1987 
Years 1971- 1976- 1981- 
1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1985 
Total Revenues 
(Bln. rubles) 172.6 245.8 336.3 354.5 354.1 362.6 
Percentage of Total Revenue 
Total Revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Transfers from 
Enterprises 36.7 33.4 32.6 34.4 37.4 35.9 
Profit Taxes 35.9 32.7 31.9 33.7 36.7 35.1 
Income Taxes 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Turnover Taxes 34.7 33.5 30.0 27.6 25.8 26.0 
Alcohol Tax n /a  n /a  12.2 11.3 9.0 9.0 
Income from 
Foreign Trade 10.2 15.8 20.2 20.1 18.2 19.1 
Taxes on 
Individuals 9.2 9.0 8.2 8.5 8.8 9.0 
0 t her Sources 9.2 8.4 9.0 9.5 9.8 9.9 
Social Insurance 
Taxes 5.8 5.4 6.6 7.2 7.5 7.7 
- - - 
Source: Gosudarstvennyy byudzhet SSSR, various years; from Ofer (1989), p.125f. 
(1) Transfers from State Enterprises 
Before 1987, these were individually determined amounts of enterprise income, chan- 
nelled either directly to  the budget or to extrabudgetary centralized funds under the 
control of industrial branch ministries. 
The determination of the exact rate was essentially one of bargaining between the min- 
istry and the enterprise, but in general the system was redistributive, as finance ministries 
set the fixed payments higher for those enterprises which had a greater surplus. 
(2) Turnover Taxes 
Turnover taxes are commodity-specific wedges between administratively-fixed retail 
and wholesale prices, minus notional wholesale and retail margins. Therefore the system 
does not entail explicit fixed rates and is not comparable to any conventional turnover 
tax found in a market-oriented economy.14 
141MF, et.al. (1991), Vol.1, p.248; excise taxes in market economies differ qualitatively, since Soviet 
turnover taxes are imposed with a far greater degree of discretion-they are commodity and enterprise 
specific. 
(3) Income from Foreign Trade 
The difference between the so-called valuta price of a good, i.e., foreign currency prices 
converted a t  the official exchange rate, and the domestic wholesale price was largely offset 
by so called price equalization taxes paid by trading enterprises to the budget or subsidies 
received from the budget. 
Part of the difference was also accounted for by customs duties and explicit import 
taxes levied on a number of consumer goods.15 
(4) Taxes of Individuals 
Taxes on individuals were not a major source of revenue in the Soviet Union, because 
Communist ideology has frowned upon taxing the population. Therefore, until June 
1990, only a very narrow-based income tax existed-practically not more than on wage 
income. Wages were withheld a t  moderate average rates, with a top marginal rate of 13% 
applicable to wages over 100 rubles per month. 
(5) Other Sources of Budgetary Income 
Apart from social insurance taxes, also loans from the central bank to the budget have 
supplemented budgetary income. Technically identical to money creation, it was seen as 
a legitimate budgetary source.16 In addition, the budget relied on the saving deposits of 
the population, as well as on, to a small extent, government bonds sold to the public. The 
various budgetary sources were shared by the government levels differently, see Table 2. 
Table 2: Republics Share of Selected Tax Revenues 1950-1980 (Percentage of USSR Total) 
Revenue Source 1950 1960 1970 1980 
Personal Income Tax 50 49.5 5 0 54.1 
Turnover Tax 12.3 35.3 44.6 57.2 
Profit Tax 38.9 65.9 45.1 40.1 
Sources: Gosbyudzhet (1962:7-9, 66-69); Gosbyudzhet (1972:ll-12, 75-78); Gosbyudzhet 
(1982:lO-11,46-48); from Bahry (1987), p.58. 
Taxes on profits accrued to the level of government where the state enterprises are 
subordinated, i.e., federal, republic, or local level. The division of turnover tax revenue 
between the federal and the republican level varied from year to year and also among the 
republics, since the percentage of turnover tax retained in each region was calculated to 
cover the gap between the expenditures planned for the republic and the available locally 
generated sources. 
A minimum of 50% of there la t ive ly  minor-revenue from taxes on individuals went 
to the republican budgets, in the case of extremely poor republics up to 100%. On the 
other hand, income from foreign trade accrued exclusively to the federal budget, retained 
by a central institution, Vneshekonombank, and only the federal level could cover its 
expenditures with central bank loans, via the state bank, Gosbank. 
3. The Budget Process and Government Expenditures 
Until 1987, the union state budget was an integral part of the consolidated financial 
plan for the economy. Its preparation, implementation, accounting, reporting, and audit 
151MF, et.al. (1991), Vol.1, p.254. 
16This is still, at least in Moscow, the case. For instance, TASS reported on May 27, 1991 that the 
USSR Supreme Soviet approved a presidential order for Gosbank to loan 5 billion rubles to the USSR 
Ministry of Finance. Report on the USSR, June 7, 1991, p.34. 
involved a large number of institutions at various levels of government, with the federal 
Ministry of Finance and Gosplan playing the key roles, see Figure 1. 
The structure of the Soviet economy was set up such that the majority of financial 
resources were gathered in one central budget-the "State Budget of the USSRv-and 
then allocated to the various lower levels and sectors as the authorities saw fit. Due to 
the consolidated nature of the state budget, at each level of government two budgets 
were prepared (with the exception of the lowest one): the budget of that level and the 
consolidated budget of all lower-level governments. 
The revenues of all budgets, except the central budget, were determined according to 
desired expenditures. Consequently, subnational budgets were strictly non-deficit, and 
the Soviet deficit was entirely concentrated at the top. 
On the expenditure side there is a division of fiscal responsibilities broadly along 
functional lines: subnational levels being responsible for social expenditures, such as 
health and education as well as social security benefits, and the union budget for defense, 
justice, internal security, subsidies to the external sector, and most budgetary investment 
in the economy. The controlling bodies of government expenditures were primarily branch 
ministries in Moscow, in particular for the industrial production sector, see Figure 2. 
4. The Division of Legislative Power in the Soviet Fiscal System 
The 1977 Soviet Constitution, which de jure  remains in force today, explicitly grants all 
decision-making power concerning taxes to the federal government of the Soviet Union. 
And, in fact, a high degree of centralization is evident from the almost complete control 
that the union authorities have exercised over the imposition of taxes (or requisition of 
enterprise income) a t  various levels of government. 
The most recent division of tax revenues between the federal and the Union republic 
level was laid down in the Decree On B u d g e t a r y  L a w  of 1987. The central government 
determined the amounts and types of taxes each level of government was to  retain, in 
particular for the major taxes, the turnover tax, and taxes on profits. 
To the extent that the Union republics or other local government bodies have exercised 
any degree of autonomy in determining the tax rates or the collection procedures, they 
did so only as a matter of discretion, not as an exercise of their sovereign powers. 
In budgetary matters, higher state authorities had to approve the main characteristics 
of the budgets of those below. Gosplan, indicating the degree of centralization, controlled 
virtually all major budgetary decisions. 
In addition to the control over lower-level expenditure behavior by central branch 
ministries, the center had absolute power to decide which decisions on expenditures had 
to  be centralized-this depended on the importance of a particular program to the federal 
government. That is, a project connected with national security was funded and managed 
from the central ministries, whereas a project in the light industry, e.g., might have been 
under republican or local jurisdiction.'' 
To sum up, despite the formal federal structure of public administration in the Soviet 
Union, the formulation and execution of fiscal policy has been highly centralized. This 
was to ensure full conformity with the central national plan. 
l 7 ~ n i g h t / w a x r n a n  (1991), p.20. 
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of higher-level and lower-level proposals; 5. Revised Plan; 6. Amended Plan; 7. Appeals to Budget 
Plans; 8. Futher Amended Plan; 9. Financed Plan. 
Source: KnightIWaxman (1991), p.12. 
70 
60 
50 
40 Eco. Expends. 
-
30 Total 
20 Industry ---- 
Aqriculture 
10 - - - - - - - -  Trons\com. 
Year 
Figure 2: Subnational Share of Soviet Budget, by Type of Expenditure. 
Industry includes construction; tans/comm: transport, communications; Housing/muny: mu- 
nicipalities. 
Sources: Gosbyudzhet, various issues, Bahry (1987), pp.50, 179-182 
B. Decentralization in the Soviet Fiscal System since 
In recent years, ethnic, cultural, and political differences in the Soviet Union have led to 
substantial regional fiscal decentralization.ls This development is, until now, only par- 
tially reflected in newly established fiscal relations between the federal and the republican 
level, which is, as shown below, an important characteristic of today's Soviet fiscal system. 
There are no clear rules, but in many cases actions are taken unilaterally and in an ad-hoc 
fashion. 
There are numerous changes, and no attempt is made to  provide an exhaustive list 
in this paper. Instead, at this point a broad overview is given which highlights the 
relations between the economic restructuring in general, and the decentralization of the 
fiscal system in the Soviet Union. We will discuss selected developments in a stylized form 
as we continue to analyze the current Soviet fiscal system using an adequate framework 
in Section 111. 
1. The Revenues from State Enterprises 
To emphasize that questions of fiscal decentralization in the Soviet Union are intrinsically 
linked to the overall changing environment, in particular to  democratization, liberalization 
and de-planning, the interrelation of enterprise decontrol and fiscal decentralization is 
looked at. 
(1) Enterprise Decontrol 
With the USSR law "On State Enterprises and Amalgations", approved by the Supreme 
Soviet at the end of 1987, a major change has occurred in the regulations governing the 
status and activities of state enterprises. In general, the law is designed to liberalize control 
and transfer more responsibility to  enterprise managers:'' the system under which, since 
1987, transfers from state enterprises to the budget and to the extrabudgetary centralized 
funds have been regulated is called the "System of Enterprise Sel f -Acc~unt ing" .~~ In 
essence, this law means a reduction of plan obligations for enterprises from the center. In 
particular the investment decisions have been increasingly taken by enterprise managers, 
and no longer by the central planning agency, Gosplan. 
(2) Shift of the Fiscal Responsibility to the Republics 
In April 1989, the USSR draft proposal on "Republican Economic Self-Management" 
was introduced. When it was eventually passed, it put a substantial number of state 
enterprises formerly belonging to  federal jurisdiction under the auspices of the republics.21 
This also means that republican authorities have responsibility for the financial standing 
of the enterprises.22 
Here it is important to  note that one impact of the just mentioned enterprise decontrol 
has been a considerable reduction of enterprise profits payments to the consolidated State 
budget: the percentage share of profit taxes and transfers from enterprises of the total 
Soviet state budget revenue fell from 34.3% (1987) to  27.1% (1990).23 Taking the two 
developments together underlines how the changing economic environment for enterprises 
1 8 ~ ~ ~ ,  et.al. (1991), Vol.1, p.241. 
lgIinight/Waxman (1991), p.6. 
20See IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vo1.3, p.248ff. for details. 
''Knight/Waxman (1991), p.18. 
22Aven/Alexashenko (1991), p.6. 
2 3 ~ l a n ~ c o n  Report (1991), No.11/12, p.18. 
Table 3: Revenues Retained by Republics Selected Taxes and Years 1980-1989 (Republic's 
Percentage Share in USSR Total) 
Years 
1980 1987 1989 
Personal Income Tax 54.1 55.5 61.0 
Profit Tax 40.1 34.9 54.0 
Sources: 1980 Bahry (1987), p.58; from Gosbyudzhet (1982:lO-11, 46-48); 1987 Knight/Wax- 
man (1991), p.17; from Gosudarstvennyi byudzhet SSSR 1988, Moscow, Finansy i statistika 
pp.5-6, 36-37; 1989 Personal Income Tax IMF et al.(1991), Vol.1, p.280; from USSR Ministry 
of Finance; Profit Tax Alexashenko (1991b), see Table 6. 
has implications which go well beyond a mere fall in overall profit tax revenues: in a 
federalist economic system this has also distributional consequences which are likely to 
trigger reactions aggravating any resulting problems. 
2. Changes in Tax System, Budget Process and Expenditure 
Responsibility 
Most prevalent is the move towards regional decentralization of the Soviet fiscal system in 
the area of taxation. For the most important sources the share of subnational governments 
in total revenues increased substantially, as Tables 3 and 4 indicate. This is true not only 
for the turnover tax, the main source of republican revenues, but also for the profit tax 
and the income tax on individuals. The overall share of subnational tax revenue increased 
during the last three years from an average of 44%-46% (1987) to  49.3% (1990).24 
The republics are questioning the absolute federal legislative power in tax legislative 
matters in their strive for greater independence. Since 1987 the republics contest the 
federal's exclusive right to retain taxes on foreign companies. Republics demand the right 
to  receive the foreign trade taxes of transactions in and out of their republic,25 and they 
require also a higher share of the personal income tax receipts. 
The draft law "On Republic Self-Management" and the June 1989 draft law "On 
Income Taxes", leading to the new union tax legislation, together with the law "On 
the Basic Principles of Economic Relations of the USSR and the Union and Autonomous 
Republics" of middle 1990, confirm and legalize in January 1991 a lot of what the republics 
had put into effect earlier: 
1. Republican budgets are now to  receive all state taxes from the reformulated income 
tax. 
2. Republics receive half of the tax receipts-the tax rate being 30%-from firms with 
a share of foreign capital which exceeds 30%. 
3. Republics also retain 70% of a 5%-sales tax on consumer goods and services, with 
the exception of food.26 
241zvestia, September 26, 1989; Aven (1990), p.140. 
25Knight/Waxman (1991), pp.19, 8. 
26See TASS, December 29, 1990; Report on the USSR, January 11, 1991, p.24f. 
Table 4: Share of Turnover Tax Revenue, by Republic (Selected years, 1980-1990) 
Union Republic 
All republics 
RSFSR 
Ukraine 
Byelorussia 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Moldavia 
Georgia 
Armenia 
Azerbaidzhan 
Kazakhstan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Tadshikistan 
Kirgizia 
Total Revenue 
(1990) 
Bln.Rb1. % of Total 
Percent Allocation 
of Turnover Tax  
1980 1989 1990 
Sources: 1980 Bahry (1987), p.56; from "Zakon SSSR o gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 
1980," in Pravda, December 1, 1979, p.2'1989 and 1990 IMF et.d.(1991), Vol.1, p.279; from 
USSR Ministry of Finance and estimates and own calculations. 
Consolidated budget of Union republics and local soviets of people's deputies. 
Allocation refers to  the proportion of revenue to be retained by Union republic from revenue 
collected within the republic. First row figures are weighted averages of Union republic amounts. 
248.7 1'00.0 
137.5 55.3 
39.5 15.9 
11.8 4.7 
1.9 0.8 
3.2 1.3 
4.3 1.7 
3.4 1.4 
4.4 1.8 
3.5 1.4 
4.4 1.8 
15.2 6.1 
2.3 0.9 
11.6 4.7 
2.7 1.1 
3.0 1.2 
58 75 8 2 
48 7 1 84 
55 61 68 
64 86 71 
57 84 76 
43 58 57 
9 1 78 94 
54 6 9 87 
6 7 100 100 
62 100 77 
53 8 1 75 
100 100 100 
100 100 100 
98 100 100 
91 100 100 
100 100 100 
In the extreme republican leaders argue that all the taxes collected in the republic must 
go into its own coffers.27 The question of legislative power in fiscal matters is important 
in view of the high subnational share which had already been reached in the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  
Furthermore, the overall subnational's share of revenues is partly the result of a complex 
system of intergovernmental transfers.2g This time the law "On Basic Principles" entrusts 
the Union republics and Autonomous republics with the fiscal responsibilities within their 
territory, subject to compliance, however, with USSR legislation.30 
The law "On Basic Principles" also had an important influence on the budgetary 
process of the Soviet Union, since from 1991 on there will be entirely independent federal, 
republican, and local  budget^.^' For 1991, the Federal Ministry of Finance has been 
responsible for the preparation of the draft budget, while the Ministries of Finance of each 
republic assumed responsibility for preparing their respective draft budgets for legislative 
action a t  the republican Another implication is that the Soviet budget deficit is 
not exclusively located on the federal level anymore, but on republican and local levels. 
For the expenditure side the fiscal decentralization movement in the Soviet Union 
manifested also in the "Basic Principles7'-Law: the approval and execution of the republic 
budgets now lies within the competence of each republic, conditional on its conformity 
with the federal laws. 
Summing up, in the last three years a crucial degree of fiscal decentralization has 
emerged in the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the increased share of subnational 
levels in major taxes and by current union legislation, most importantly the Law "On 
Basic Principles" and the tax legislation effective as of January 1991. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, Soviet reality today already goes beyond this, and sub- 
national levels are, if anything, likely to gain even more power: for instance, the union 
tax legislation of January 1991 still assigns the taxes on foreign trade to  the federal level, 
whereas de facto in a number of republics has set up their own customs.33 
111. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC FEDERALISM 
It is argued that today's fiscal stance of the Soviet economy is closely connected with an 
overall change in the intergovernmental relations in the Soviet Union. While so far the 
fiscal relations were dominated by the center, now, as shown in Section II.B, a substantial 
amount of fiscal decision-making power has been passed on to  subnational levels. This 
warrants a new look on the Soviet fiscal system in terms of a theory which emphasizes es- 
pecially the structure of the underlying government: this is what the Theory of Economic 
Federalism does. A federal economic system is one in which public functions are provided 
27See Alexashenko (1990), p.8. 
28See Bahry (1987); Table 2, profit tax share in 1960. 
2gFor this, see KnightlWaxman (1991). 
30The exact meaning of this qualifier is still to be seen. 
31Alexashenko (1990), p.20; on March 29, 1991, the Chairman of the Lithuanian standing budget 
commission, A.Rudis, told TASS that Lithuania's budget was now completely separate from the USSR's. 
Report on the USSR, April 5, 1991, p.35f. 
3 2 ~ M ~ ,  et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.259. 
33This is, i .e. ,  the case in Ukraine and Byelorussia, see IMF, et.a1.(1991.), Vol.1, p.257. 
34See also van Rompuy/Abraham/Heremans (1990). 
for by a multi-level public sector which consists of the federal, state (or republic), and 
local government. 
This paper is primarily concerned with demand management and fiscal stability, thus, 
according to the Musgravian classification the stabilization branch of the government has 
been reached. Although recent work has dealt with questions of stabilization policy in 
a federalist economy using this a p p r ~ a c h , ~ '  instead, "fiscal stability" is often thought 
to be a good produced by the public sector. This leads back from the stabilization to 
the allocative branch. As it turns out, this interpretation is particularly revealing for 
additional problems of achieving fiscal stability in a multi-level government. 
The approaches which have been taken can be divided into an essentially normative 
one which concentrates on the optimal assignment of these functions to the different levels 
of government-an "optimal" allocation of public functions would satisfy an efficiency cri- 
terion like Pareto-optimality and guarantees the highest overall welfare of its constituents. 
In the more recent positive contributions, governments are no longer treated as monolithic 
blocks maximizing a given social welfare function, the "benevolent dictator assumption," 
but politicians maximize their own welfare, properly defined, and more generally, the 
government is a playing field of various interest groups and bureaucrats, each of which 
is also aiming at its own welfare. The resulting division and performance of public func- 
tions will, in general, not be optimal in the efficiency sense. In the following, the current 
situation in the Soviet Union is first analyzed in terms of the normative concept, before 
the assumption of the benevolent dictator is withdrawn in part two. 
B. The Normative Theory of Economic Federalism 
In this part, the normative theory of fiscal federalism is outlined. General concepts are 
introduced for the decision on which public function optimally-bearing in mind the 
special interest in the production of "fiscal stabilityv-to assign on which government 
level. It should be emphasized at the outset that there is no suggestion that any decision- 
maker in the Soviet Union today thinks in terms of the theory, nor that its assumptions 
are true in the descriptive sense.36 But to see how and why a federal fiscal system 
is constructed optimally in a certain way helps to understand exactly from where the 
problems in the Soviet system stem. It is exactly those mechanisms for which the theory 
suggests the fiscal stabilization function to be highly centralized that are causing losses 
in the decentralized Soviet system today. 
1. Outline of the Theory 
The allocation of public functions to  various members of the federation is a fundamental 
issue. In order to  assign expenditure responsibilities, Oates (1972) advanced the so-called 
"decentralization theorem" which states that each public service should be provided by 
the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize 
the costs and benefits of such provision. 
This gives a strong a priori argument for decentralization. Local provision allows 
governments to cater better to the preferences of local residents, whereas central provision 
often results in more uniform provision. Also, decision making is closer to the people for 
whom the services are intended. This induces more responsiveness to  local concerns as 
35See Ter-Minassian (1991). 
36That the assumptions do not hold is exactly why inefficiencies arise; see esp. pp.14ff. 
well as more fiscal responsibility and efficiency of provision, especially where financing of 
services is decentralized as Given the vast area and regional diversity of the Soviet 
Union, these considerations of differences in tastes and needs are particularly important. 
Under quite restrictive  assumption^,^^ then, the so-called "Tiebout-Solution" applies: the 
production of private and public goods takes place at some given points in space and 
consumers will move in order to find the package of goods that suits them best. Preferences 
for public goods are revealed by consumers who move around, "voting with their feet". 
In the case of spatial externalities, when costs and/or benefits of public services are 
realized by non-residents of that jurisdiction (spill-overs), Coase (1960) argues that these 
will be internalized via bargaining among the involved jurisdictions. This is the essence 
of the so-called "Coase Theorem". The ideal world sketched above is, however, far from 
any real economic environment. Several things need to be taken into account: 
1. Firstly, mobility is less than perfect and involves private and, in some cases, social 
costs due to externalities. 
2. More f ~ n d a m e n t a l l y , ~ ~  jurisdictions which want to enter into bargaining face the 
problem of imperfect information and transaction costs. The requirements for effi- 
cient bargains are indeed high: 
(i) All parties should have perfect knowledge about each other's preferences and 
endowments. 
(ii) Strategic behavior, which leads to hiding one's true preferences, should not 
occur. 
(iii) In order not to have insuperably high transaction costs, the number of parties 
should be sufficiently small. 
If these conditions do not prevail, the bargaining process might break down. In this 
case, efficiency can be restored by establishing a central institution, government, or 
a constitutional court that acts as a coordinator between parties and enforces the 
agreements. 
3. There is a third reason for provision a t  a higher level when production entails lower 
costs than on lower hierarchical levels, for instance due to increasing returns to scale. 
Summarizing, the blueprint for a federal economy according to the Theory of Federalism 
displays strong tendencies of decentralization. There are only three motives for assigning 
government functions to a hierarchically higher level: decreasing costs of provision, ex- 
ternalities and failure to reach agreements between competitive lower-level governments. 
These elements will be identified in today's Soviet fiscal system. 
37Shah (1991), p.2. 
38See Rubinfeld (1987). 
39This is more fundamental since externalities of the above mentioned type could, in principle, be 
cured by an agreement between jurisdictions. But the fact that  often the externality is not subject to  
bargaining then is usually explained by a transaction costs-argument. 
2. Consequences of Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Union 
2.1.1 T h e  P rob l em Awareness o n  Lower Government Levels 
Due to the minor role of public finance in a centrally planned economy, financial consid- 
erations did not have high priority even after the introduction of the new leadership of 
Gorbachev in 1985. The budget deficit was not published until October 1988.40 Observers 
in the Soviet Union find that the republics are even less aware of the destructive forces 
of mismanaged public finances in an economy.41 While this can not be generalized to all 
subnational governments-certainly not to the Baltic Republics-it might well hold as an 
overall judgement, since awareness of the role of public finance could not easily develop 
in the republics in times of strict federal control and dependence on the center. Evidence 
provides the fact that until the middle of February 1991 each third republic and a lot 
of regions had no current and up-to-date budget.42 This increased unawareness on fiscal 
questions works like a mark-up on the costs of achieving fiscal stability. 
2.1.2 Administrat ive a n d  Compliance Costs 
While in terms of Fiscal Federalism Theory it is generally agreed that a centralized system 
leads to lower administrative and compliance costs,43 in January 1990 the USSR Council 
of Ministers created the State Tax Service, which encompasses republic and local tax 
offices.44 Its structure is complicated enough to require an additional coordinating and 
managing department in the USSR Ministry of Finance, the Main State Tax Inspectorate. 
The State Tax Service is not organized along functional lines, but according to the taxes 
that are assigned to a particular unit, and this structure is replicated on all levels of the 
organization. It is conducive to duplication of work, poor coordination, and higher costs. 
Organizational failures in the course of fiscal decentralization are exacerbated by the 
fact that the technical capacities of republican and local bodies are lower than in the 
center. In the Soviet Union tax administration has been weakening over time, because 
under central planning most revenues were transferred to the budget through debiting of 
a relatively small number of large state enterprise accounts at Gosbank (or its branches). 
Sophisticated ways of tax evasion and other problems of enforcement are therefore largely 
unknown. The destruction of the tax administration system culminated in the 1960's 
with its complete dismantling. Since then these functions have been performed by the 
Ministries of Finance on various levels.45 
With the arrival of the mass income tax system, the privatization of state enterprises, 
the development of a large number of small- to medium-sized enterprises and the increase 
in foreign direct investment, new ways of tax evasion and avoidance will be found. Since 
most of the subnational bodies lack the knowledge, staff, and technological means to fulfill 
40Aslund (1991), p.3. 
41Alexashenko (1990), p.25. 
42Alexashenko (1991a), p.5f. 
43Shah (1991), p.2; in the United States the administrative costs of the federal individual income tax 
amount to only about 0.5% of revenues. In contrast, at the state level these costs for income taxation 
are roughly 1% to 2% of tax receipts, Oates (1977), p.15. 
44See the chart in IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.295. 
45See IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.256. 
many of the basic tasks which have been or will be assigned to them,46 tax revenues will 
fall. 
On the other hand, it can be expected that tax morality is higher if taxes collected 
and spent for republican purposes, which might counteract the loss of revenues due to 
the lack of trained personnel on lower levels, at least in some republics. However far this 
motive takes, in the disintegrating Soviet Union the lack of trained staff will reduce tax 
morality even there, and might well be self-defeating: the not to-be-prevented increase in 
tax evasion and avoidance in the beginning might undermine the taxpayer's perception of 
the fairness of the system and therefore their willingness to comply voluntarily with the 
tax legislation in future.47 
2.2  EXTERNALITIES DUE TO FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
2.2.1 Moral Hazard on Lower Government Levels 
The concept of "moral hazard" was introduced in the area of economics recently, where 
one party in a relation may undertake certain actions that: 
(a) affect the other party's valuation of the action, but that 
(b) the second party cannot monitor and enforce perfectly. 
A classic example is fire insurance, where the insuree may or may not exhibit sufficient care 
while storing flammable materials. In this setting the outcome depends on whether the 
insurance company, sometimes called the "principal", can give incentives to the insuree, 
called the "agent", such that the latter behaves in a way which is preferred by the former. 
We will apply this concept in a generalized form to the Soviet Union. The devolving 
fiscal system suggests an analysis in the principal-agent framework, since the center can 
not perfectly observe the behavior of subnational levels, and to which extent they are 
abusing their newly gained de facto and/or de jure power in fiscal matters. 
The externality, then, lies in the fact that despite transferring tax revenues and ex- 
penditure authority to lower level governments, there is a probability greater than zero 
that the federal level acts as a lender of last resort in the case of credit default on the 
part of lower level governments-it will bail them out. 
This will give certain disincentives to republics, as will be discussed in turn. The neg- 
ative externality could be internalized only if the federal level would abstain consistently 
from any financial rescue operation, or if the center could perfectly monitor financially 
weak lower-level behavior. The notion that the center might have perfect control can 
be rejected: many of the lower-level governments themselves48 can only guess their fiscal 
stance, and even more than before the center must expect to receive biased information 
from the republics. 
The reason why there is a positive bail-out probability in the Soviet Union is historical: 
past attempts to decentralize failed for a number of reasons. Most importantly, there are 
inflexibilities inherent in the existing system that tend to make the economy return to its 
original shape.49 Therefore it resembles fully rational economic behavior for financially 
weak republics to attach a non-zero probability to an eventual bail-out by the federal 
level. 
46See IMF, et.al. (1991), Vo1.2, p.239; Alexashenko (1990), p.23. 
470wens (1990), p.14. 
48See Alexashenko (1991a), p.5f. 
49See KnightIWaxman (1991), p.25 on this. 
a. Spend ing  Behavior  of t h e  Republ ics  
As international evidence shows, lower-level governments tend to overspend in this 
situation. Particularly the recent experience of the fiscal decentralization in Brazil in 
the 1980's has confirmed the view that all newly assigned revenue inflows to subnational 
levels are promptly spent, whereas the corresponding responsibilities for formerly federal 
programs are in general not taken up. Also large parts of the external debt of subnational 
governments were shifted in large scale bail-out operations to  the federal g~vernment.~ '  
Over the last ten years Union republics doubled spending while they increased their 
revenue only by 50%,51 and to  some respect, the former system with only one budget 
deficit a t  the union level can be seen as a bail-out mechanism by design. However, the 
important difference is that now the control of central levers is much less effective. 
Indeed, given the prevalent uncertainty about the irreversibility of the decentralization 
movement, and the difficulties for the center to monitor subnational's behavior, let alone 
enforce their new responsibilities, all levels of government want to just maximize their 
expendi t ~ r e . ' ~  
b. Regu la t ing  t h e  Access t o  Regional  Cen t ra l  B a n k s  
A second major issue in this context is the extent to which lower level governments 
are restricted in their refinancing decisions. On the one hand, there is the question to 
what extent subnational governments have access to the domestic and foreign capital 
markets.53 On the other, whether they can refinance themselves directly a t  the domestic 
central bank. The latter gains special importance in the Soviet Union since the banking 
system is under reform. With the Central Banking Law, finally approved in December 
1990, a Union Reserve System has been created, consisting of Gosbank in Moscow and 
republican central banks. 
The new law allows for bank financing of the union and republic budgets up to the 
limits established by the Supreme Soviet. However, under exceptional circumstances, 
which are not specified by the law, the President of the USSR can authorize short-term 
credits in "limited" amounts in excess of the approved amounts.54 Even this arrangement. 
will most likely not hold water: in the Soviet Union, Union republic governments are 
increasingly claiming their right to use the state banks as sources of financing." 
Again, one can learn from recent Brazilian and Italian experience, but especially from 
Yugoslavia that such transactions are bound to require subsequent bail-out operations, 
either by the budget of the national government or the union central bank.56 
This is so in the case in the Soviet. Union: it seems the less a republic restricts its 
expenditures, the more it will claim to have its deficit covered by forcible selling of obli- 
gations to central banks.57 And a lesson drawn from Soviet history would tell that credits 
from the central bank are indeed a legitimate source of filling government coffers. 
5001iveira/Velloso (1991), p.24f., p.32. 
51Aven/Alexashenko (1991), p.2. 
52See Alexashenko (1991a), p.4. 
53See IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.247 on this. 
54See IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.371. 
55The Moldavian President Snegur issued a decree founding a Moldavian National Bank by means 
of what, in effect, amounted to a takeover of the Moldavian branch of USSR Gosbank. While it is 
due to  become operational by December 1991, there is no indication of a change of policy relative to 
Gosbank's. Report on the USSR, June 14, 1991, p.34; also the Georgian parliament decided to take 
over the Gosbank's branch on its territory and create a central bank; TASS, August 16,1991, from Neue 
Zurcher Zeitung, August 18/19, 1991, 11.13. 
56See Ter-Minassian (1991), p.4. 
57~lexashenko (1990), p.19. 
Table 5: Personal Income Taxation as of January 1991 (In rubles) 
More than 3000 859.2 +0.50x(I-3000) 1 More than 3000 814 +0.50 x (1-3000) 
Sources: Union legislation from Aven/Alexashenko (1991), p.14; tax on income from principal 
occupation; RSFSR legislation from official register, December 1990. 
Union Legislation Russian (RSFSR) Legislation 
Although moral hazard behavior on the part of the republics is central to the ne- 
gotiations among republican central banks5' and the union central bank, objective and 
transparent rules for permissible subnational financial operations and their outright bar- 
ring from borrowing from the banking system are not in sight. The only exception is 
Russia (RSFSR), which legislated the 1991 limit for its deficit a t  5% of total republican 
revenue.59 However, this limit was not obeyed: during the first quarter of 1991 the Rus- 
sian budget was in deficit at an annual rate of 120 billion rubles,60 which is around 40% 
of Russian tax revenue. 
Income (I) Magnitude of 
per Month Payment 
Less than 160 0 
2.2.2 Tax Base Erosion due to Interjurisdictional Tax Competition 
Income (I) Magnitude of 
per Month Payment 
Less than 200 0 
Another externality stems from the ongoing so-called "War of Laws" in the Soviet Union. 
This refers to the fact that in the Soviet Union there are currently different fiscal-legislative 
regulations existing parallel to each other. It is particularly important in the area of 
taxation: despite the most recent tax reform efforts of 1991, contradictions between the 
Union and republican legislations prevail. 
The legislation of the Russian republic fixed the tax on so-called excessive profits at 
the single rate of 75%, whereas the rate is 80%-90% according to the Union legislation. 
Also Russia's personal income tax scheme differs from that of the federal level, see Table 5. 
Estonia introduced a progressive tax scale on enterprise profits, whereas the union 
legislation set a flat rate of, at the time of writing, 35%. Also personal income taxation 
differs there from the union legislation. And the republics in general require to  receive 
75% of the revenues of the consumption expenditure tax and the capital gains tax, instead 
of 50% according to  the federal law.61 Differing tax legislation across space is no argu- 
ment for re-centralization per se. On the contrary, as mentioned above, the competitive 
behavior of subnational jurisdiction is an essential ingredient of a Tiebout-type process, 
and consequentially, a Pareto optimal outcome. However, the current situation in the 
58Alexashenko (1990), p. 19. 
59Alexashenko (1990), p. 15. 
'O~han in  (1991); Report on the USSR, July 19, 1991, p.2. 
'lSee Aven/Alexashenko (199 1) for details. 
Soviet Union is very different from the setting which would assure the Tiebout-consistent 
solution,62 and therefore losses emerge because of decentralization. 
Two important violations are: firstly, as was experienced in market economies, primar- 
ily less developed jurisdictions-which suffer the most acute revenue need-are engaged in 
tax competition, seeking to attract any investment inflow possible by offering tax holidays, 
reduced tax rates, etc. In Western market economies these countries are usually liquidity 
constrained-as is, by any measures, the central government in the Soviet Union-thereby 
preventing a Pareto optimal outcome.63 The argument holds especially in the Soviet econ- 
omy, since financial markets are barely existing at all. Secondly, the Tiebout outcome 
requires that consumer's mobility is costless and responsive only to fiscal conditions. But 
in the Soviet Union today tax legislative acts are following so close to one another that 
migration flows are hardly observed. Without this a Tiebout-like sorting process can not 
work, but instead, the system will be dynamically unstable: both the republics and the 
central government introduce tax legislations to capture tax revenue a t  the source, which 
simply leads to tax base erosion and, ceteris paribus, to a higher overall deficit. 
A clear example of this: in January 1991, the new federal tax legislation set the tax rate 
for ordinary, i.e., those which do not allow the enterprise to exceed given limits of return 
fixed by the Parliament (de jure) or by the central government (de facto), operational 
profits at 45%, from which 22% should go to the union budget, and up to 23% to the 
republic. The Russian government, in turn, fixed the profit tax rate for the majority of 
enterprises under its subordination at 38%.64 But on March 23, 1991 Gorbachev released 
a Presidential Decree which set the tax rate again lower than the Russian government, 
from 45% to 35%.65 This rate is still to be approved by the Parliament, and is unlikely 
to be the last word in the competitive but self-destructive tax revenue seeking until all 
sides agree on clear and enforceable sharing arrangements. 
2.3.  COORDINATION FAILURES A N D  FREE RIDING 
As noted in Section III.B.l, a third reason for provision on a higher hierarchical level 
according to the Theory of Fiscal Federalism are obstacles which prevent governments 
from reaching a bargaining solution on the underlying e x t e r n a l i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
The most obvious point is that institutions which have a coordinating function to 
overcome this do not exist (any more). 
2.3.1 A Lack of Coordinating  institution^^^ 
During the last three years the Soviet Union has witnessed a considerable amount of de- 
struction of the former policy-making bodies, primarily the Central Committee apparatus 
and the Council of Ministers, without any new institutional framework set in their place. 
Although it is a common presumption that the dissolution of these old institutions is a 
62See Rubinfeld (1987), ~ p . 5 7 5 ~ 5 9 1 .  
63See Atkinson/Stiglitz (1980)) p.150. 
641n addition, this was to give an incentive for state enterprises to switch from federal to Russian 
subordination. 
65TASS on March 23, 1991; the 35% are to be shared, with 17% to the federal level, and 18% to the 
republics. Report on the USSR, April 5,  1991, p.22. 
661n the case of the Soviet Union today, most externalities emerge among the center and republics, not 
among republics. The basic concepts, however, carry over, if one thinks of the higher hierarchical level as 
a constitution, or, in fact, Union Deaty, which is binding for republics and center. 
6 7 ~ e e  Aslund (1991), IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, ~ p . 2 4 2 ~ 2 7 4 .  
necessary condition for further progress to a market economy, this imposes at the same 
time a high cost upon the Soviet Union. 
For now, functioning institutions are often simply not available: from a mechanism 
to negotiate the controversial issue of tax-legislative competition to an institution which 
is capable of dealing with technical questions of budget preparation; in many areas the 
developments of fiscal decentralization are ahead of newly needed institution-building. 
Recognizing that fact, the Presidential Guidelines of October 1990 envisage the cre- 
ation of an Interrepublic Economic Committee, composed of plenipotentiary representa- 
tives of the republics, under the Federation Council, to coordinate measures introduced 
by all republics. In turn, the members of the Federation Council are the deputy prime 
ministers of the republics, chaired by the President of the Soviet Union. But even after 
the executive powers of the Council have been strengthened substantially following the 
session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held on November 17, 1990, the lack of bodies that 
can coordinate economic policies is still a major shortcoming of the situation in the Soviet 
Union today.68 
2.3.2 Coord ina t ion  Failures 
It is argued above that there is a case for centralized provision of a public service if the 
costs of bargaining between subnational governments is excessively high. In economics, 
quite distinct approaches are applying their concepts in the case that there are obstacles of 
bargaining on externalities: property rights theorists refer to high transaction costs of the 
agreement, game theorists stress the agents strategic behavior and worse- than-possible 
deadlock situations, Prisoner's Dilemmata, and public finance economists speak of the 
free-rider problem and argue the service to be provided is a public one. 
They share the idea that the interaction of economic agents (here, the national and. 
subnational governments), simply left by themselves, will not lead to the first-best, Pareto- 
optimal outcome. As the concepts are not mutually exclusive, they are linked in the 
following eclectically to observed behavior in the Soviet Union. 
a. High  Transact ion  C o s t s  
The fiscal decentralization allows, since 1990, for budget deficits also on subnational 
levels. Though it is true that also in other countries the possibility of subnational deficits 
exists, in the Soviet Union this immediately has intensified the haggle over tax revenues 
among jurisdictions. The reason is obvious: since the federal level can not enforce its 
laws, noncompliance is an option; when Estonia could not balance its budget in 1990, it 
simply reduced its contribution to the union budget.69 
In addition, devolving greater responsibility to subnational levels is often accompanied 
by increased localism and politically based ideas of self-sufficiency, as had been seen in 
China and Yugoslavia.70 In the Soviet Union today, each republic wants to decide indi- 
vidually on its level of participation in each federal spending program.71 These changed 
priorities raise transaction costs, too. 
Does fiscal decentralization mean increased inequality of wealth across Soviet Union 
republics? The complex taxltransfer system in the Soviet Union can not be analyzed 
68However, according to TASS of June 7, 1991, the Commission rejected a proposal to divide republics 
in those willing to sign a Union Treaty and those which are not, and kept the option of cooperation open. 
On the other hand, Lithuania and Estonia are only participating in the Commission as observers. Report 
on the USSR, June 14, 1991, p.38. 
69See Alexashenko (1990), p.10. 
7 0 ~ e e  Blejer/Szapary (1989), Knight/Waxman (1991), p.25. 
71See Alexashenko (1990), p.10. 
here, in trying to find an answer to the often-posed question "Who feeds whom?". But 
it is widely agreed that in a decentralized Soviet system poor regions are falling further 
behind.72 This means that over time the costs of reaching an agreement on interrepublican 
redistribution are rising. 
b. Noncooperative Behavior 
In game theoretic terms, we consider Union republics on the one hand, and the national 
government on the other, as two players who attempt to find their dominant strategy, i.e., 
which is optimal regardless of what the other player is doing. Observing Soviet players, 
one has the impression that they completely neglect mutually advantageous actions by 
trying to shift the financial burdens to the opponent. This is the familiar "Prisoner's 
Dilemma": distributional conflicts prevent the players to reach the first-best, cooperative 
solution. The outcome is one of collective irresponsibility: 
(1) The upward revenue sharing scheme, which Russia and the Ukraine favor in the on- 
going negotiations on a new "Union Treaty", is de facto already in use for some time. 
Also its unpromising experience in Spain and Yugoslavia-the transfer amounts are 
subject to annual negotiations, no effective enforcement of one republic's contri- 
bution-has been confirmed in the Soviet Union recently: several republics have 
retained already in 1990, and more so in 1991, a higher share of tax revenue than 
allocated.73 Although this is, at  least by now, an open secret, the national level does 
not reduce its spending activities correspondingly: in the first quarter of 1991 the 
central budget spent more than two and a half times of what has been transferred 
from the republics.74 
(2) Similar in spirit is the recent move of some republics, under which are Ukraine and 
Byelorussia, to set up own customs,75 and, consequently, to withhold revenue the 
union tax legislation of 1991 still assigns to the center. 
(3) In the late 1980s, Moscow has promised an increase in social programs for the people 
in recent years, to compensate for the neglect of past years and current economic 
hardships. Now these programs are handed over to subnational levels, who are, for 
lack of funds, not keen to take them.76 
(4) Subnational governments have also learned that the increased number of state en- 
terprises under their subordination is more a burden than an asset: still on June 8, 
7 2 ~ e e  KnightIWaxman (1991), p.25. 
730n January 5, 1991, the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Yeltsin told reporters that the 
RSFSR had agreed to contribute about 78 billion rubles, 27 billion short of the center's demand. Report 
on the USSR, January 18, 1991, p.31; On March 29, 1991, USSR Finance Minister V.Orlov told Pravda 
that seven republics, the RSFSR, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and the Baltic republics, had failed to 
transfer tax revenue to  the central budget, Russia alone 66 billion rubles. Report on the USSR, April 
5, 1991, p.35; On April 4, the USSR Supreme Soviet sent an appeal to  the legislatures of the fifteen 
union republics asking them to make their full contributions to the central government's budget, TASS 
reported. Report on the USSR, April 12, 1991, p.31f. On April 10, 1991, A.Orlov, deputy chairman 
of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Planning and Finance told "Rabochaya tribuna" that the 
RSFSR had withheld all of the (then, W.K.) 45% corporation tax (tax on profits, W.K.) and the 5% 
sales tax levied since January, 1. Report on the USSR, April 19, 1991, p.20f. According to  Latvian Prime 
Minister I.Godmanis, the central government and Latvia agreed on 350 million rubles, not 4.2 billion, 
as the center had demanded, as the Latvian contribution to the central budget in 1991-this is 8.3%. 
(Radio Moscow, April 27, 1991); Report on the USSR, May 10, 1991, p.27. 
7 4 ~ v e n  (1991), p.20. 
7 5 ~ e e  IMF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.257. 
76See KnightIWaxman (1991), p.21; Alexashenko (1990). p.12. 
1991, the Ukrainian Prime Minister V.Fokin told parliament that the republic must 
take control over all Soviet enterprises in the republic. 
A week later, on June 16, 1991, he said in an interview with Vremya on the contrary 
that the Ukrainian government had no intention of owning such enterprises. He 
claimed that his government had had a bad experience with the transfer of the coal 
industry to republican ownership, and it now realized that it simply could not afford 
to own all of the industries on Ukrainian 
(5) Short-term goals clearly dominate tax legislation in the Soviet Union today. This is 
evidenced by the new 5% sales tax, introduced by the union legislation in January 
1991. The tax was a desperate, and unsu~cessful ,~~ attempt of the center to acquire 
new sources of revenues: already on May 21, 1991 the USSR central government 
repealed the 5% sales tax selectively. This decision was a consequence of a joint 
declaration by Gorbachev and the leaders of nine union republics on April 23, 1991, 
which led to new optimism in the center concerning cooperation with the republics.79 
c. Financial Stabil i ty as a Public Good: T h e  Case of t h e  "Stabilization 
 fund^''^^ 
In the end of 1990, the central budget as well as the republican budgets has been 
divided into the actual budget and essentially extrabudgetary so-called stabilization funds: 
the idea of the union tax legislation of January 1991 was to collect 37% of the enterprises 
wage funds as social insurance payments. Although resistance of the enterprises forced the 
rate down to 26%, the union insisted nevertheless on collecting 37%, with 11% assigned 
to the stabilization funds." The purpose was intended to be support for privatization, 
infrastructure investment, and enterprise restructuring, and they were said to function 
only temporarily. 
International experience suggests that extrabudgetary funds are bound to weaken 
budgetary control as in Poland 1990, where they became simply a part of the state 
budget. In the Soviet Union, both the federal and subnational levels have participated 
in obscuring the fiscal stance: the federal government delegated the deficit both to the 
republics and to the stabilization funds, and the republics in turn delegated their deficits 
to their stabilization funds. In addition, the Baltic republics refused to contribute to the 
funds any longer after the center financed its share with a 5 billion central bank loan 
approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet on May 27, 1991.82 
Finally, the balance of the stabilization funds has apparently not been made 
The example shows clearly the public good-character of "fiscal stability"; due to the at 
least partial non-excludability, every level has an incentive to act as a free rider if others 
start to produce the good "fiscal stability". This leads to an underprovision since no level 
77TASS, Izvestia, June 8,  1991, and Vremya, June 16, 1991; Report on the USSR, June 14, 1991, p.38 
and Report on the USSR, June 28, 1991, p.31f., respectively. 
78See footnote 73. 
7gTASS, May 21, 1991; Report on the USSR, May 31, 1991, p.31. 
''On December 29, 1990, President Gorbachev announced its creation, operating effectively on January 
1, 1991 (TASS); Report on the USSR, January 11, 1991, p.24f; see also Aslund (1991); Aven/Alexashenko 
(1991); IMF, et.a1.(1991). 
"Another source was, according to  USSR Finance Minister V.Pavlov, taxes on proceeds from the 
privatization of state property. Central Television, December 29, 1990. Report on the USSR, January 
11, 1991, p.24f. 
82TASS, May 27, 1991; Report on the USSR, June 7,  1991, p.34. 
83Aslund (1991), p.16. 
has an incentive to keep public finances under control as long as there is no guarantee 
that others also do so. 
This is just another case of a coordination failure among agents. To summarize, in a 
number of ways both republics and the federal level have acted in their perceived short- 
term interest, thereby adding to the Soviet economic difficulties. Not only time has been 
wasted before deeply rooted systemic changes are implemented, but a t  the same time this 
has caused a further deterioration of the Soviet fiscal stance. 
C. The Positive Theory of Economic Federalism 
1. Outline of the Theory 
As mentioned above, the positive approach to economic federalism is closely related to 
the analysis of the government. To this end, most of the concepts are discussed in the 
so-called Theory of Public Choice. This line of thinking is therefore introduced in turn. 
Public Choicea4 can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision-making. 
The major contribution of Public Choice has been that of endogenizing political decision- 
making: the state, far from being a "benevolent dictator" maximizing a social welfare 
function, is a t  least partially endogenous, and the policies it institutes reflect vested in- 
terests in society. The theory applies standard neo-classical economic theory to Political 
Science. Thus, the approach is one of methodological individualism: the tools of opti- 
mization are applied to actors in the government field, in particular politicians, voters, 
burea.ucrats and interest groups (lobbies). Public Choice models building on such charac- 
teristics are to  some political scientists all but a naive caricature of political behavior. But 
public choice theorists point to the positive research agenda and argue that these models 
are justified if they out-perform the competing models in explaining political behavior. 
There is no consensus reached on this issue: the theoretical basis of Public Choice 
models is still often considered to be to a substantial degree ad hoc, without convincing 
behavioral assumptions. Also testing proved relatively difficult, since most of the relevant 
variables are not observable. Nevertheless, the concepts have increasingly and fruitfully 
been applied to a number of areas.a5 We also see a role in explaining the current situation 
in the Soviet Union. 
A large part of Public Choice theory is devoted to inefficiencies due to the agent's 
behavior, be it the politician, the bureaucrat, etc., relative to the first-best world, where 
a market failure is promptly cured by political action. Analogously, these inefficiencies 
are referred to as government failures. Public Choice theorists point out that these may 
be substantial, and in cases even higher than the losses due to the market failure in the 
first place. 
Indeed, consensus is widespread that a market failure is only a necessary, not a suf- 
ficient condition for government intervention. In many cases these inefficiencies rely on 
high costs of monitoring and controlling the agent's behavior. Due to informational con- 
straints for voters, taxpayers and consumers, politicians and bureaucrats can exercise a 
considerable degree of discretion and pursue their individual goals of being in office, such 
84See Mueller (1978) on the following. 
85See, e.g., Roubini/Sachs (1989), Alesina/Tabellini (1988). 
ass6 power, prestige, income, perquisites which generally do not coincide with society's 
overall welfare. We interpret this political leeway as budgetary means for discretionary 
use. 
1.2 IMPLICATIONS OF DECENTRALIZATION: THE VIEWS OF BRENNAN/ 
BUCHANAN A N D  MOESEN/VAN R O M P U Y * ~  
In which sense is the move towards decentralization in the Soviet Union important for 
Public Choice considerations, then? The relevant difference lies primarily in the fact that 
the number of agents involved has increased and/or their function has changed: now there 
are more subnational bureaucrats and politicians. One might, therefore, expect Public 
Choice theory predicting higher inefficiencies with a decentralized system. 
However, the "decentralization-hypothesisn proposed by Brennan and Buchanan con- 
tends that fiscal federalism can serve, on the contrary, as a constraint on the expansion 
of government. They argue that "total government intrusion in the economy should be 
smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decen- 
tralized" (p.185). The main argument is based on a greater political competition between 
the various fiscal jurisdictions. In a centralized setting the monopoly power to extract 
resources through tax legislation is less challenged than with a decentralized multi-layer 
government. Here citizens have access to  comparative political shopping which introduces 
a dimension of contestability on the political markets. 
Moesenlvan Rompuy argue, in addition, that there is a relation between the fiscal 
outcome of the political decision process and the status of the budget constraint. Under 
a soft budget constraint it is expected that the political decision-makers will give in more 
easily to the demands of interest groups and bureaucrats, as only a part of the tax bill 
has to be presented to the taxpayer-voters. 
They find the demand management function in most countries assigned to the central 
level, hence there is the possibility of incurring deficits pursuing Keynesian deficit spending 
policies, whereas subnational levels often face harder budget constraints, they argue: 
public borrowing is often restricted on the domestic as well as the international capital 
markets, and in any case, subnational levels are not entitled to  money creation and the 
associated seigniorage. Two things can be observed: 
(1) Normative and Positive Theory of Economic Federalism are thus far highly comple- 
mentary. The dissolution of the government block does not give any insights which 
would run counter to the previous analysis, the only change being that now one does 
not only think of the republic's consumer-taxpayers, but realize that the republic's 
rational behavior is formulated, channelled and executed by selfish bureaucrats and 
politicians whose personal gain is linked to the republics' welfare. 
(2) The arguments advanced by BrennanlBuchanan and Moesen/van Rompuy do not 
contradict the presented analysis at all-rather, they confirm it. This is so because 
there is no functioning tax competition between jurisdictions in the Soviet Union 
today, but destabilizing tax base erosion (see III.B.2.2.2), and there are no restric- 
tions on subnational financial operations, but Union republics are even about to 
gain access to regional central banks (see III.B.2.2.1 .b), etc. 
86Niskanen, in Mueller (1978), p.185. 
87~rennan/~uchanan (1980); Moesen/van Fbmpuy (1990). 
However, Public Choice theory developed other arguments which should be elements of 
the positive Theory of Fiscal Federalism in the Soviet Union today. 
2. Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Union: Public Choice 
Mechanisms at Work 
The study of the behavior of bureaucracies is a central element of Public Choice theory. 
The standard model is that of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat in a bilateral monopoly 
setting between administration and sponsor, due to Ni~kanen.~' Because of the unob- 
servability of the true costs of the bureaucracy's service to the sponsor, the bureaucracy 
succeeds in extending its output beyond the social optimum, where marginal public ben- 
efits equal public costs. 
In a devolving fiscal system the tax administration on subnational levels will increas- 
ingly try to capture some of rents of the center bureaucracy, thereby also maximize its 
budget, given that many discretionary goals are positively correlated to the budget size. 
On the other hand, as a reaction federal bureaucracies will attempt to slow down the 
devolutionary process. Ukrainian Prime Minister V.Fokin told the Ukrainian parliament 
on June 7, 1991 that some USSR ministries had been creating joint-stock companies out 
of their enterprises in Ukraine only for the purpose of preventing these properties from 
being transferred to republican ownership. 
In general, this leads to superposition and duplication of public functions, and its 
fiscal impact is an increase of the size of the public sector and of its deficit, as the recent 
Brazilian experience confirmed, 
Populist Pressure and Competing Politicians 
Pioneers in analyzing politician and voter behavior in representative democratic sys- 
tems are A. Downs and W. Nordha~s.~ '  Politicians are, in principle, seen as political 
entrepreneurs-maximizing votes-but also here costly and therefore imperfect surveil- 
lance through the voters leaves the politician room to pursue his own goals (Downs). And 
a successful strategy to gain popular support and win the next elections is to increase 
shortly before social expenditure, but taxes only afterwards (Nordhaus). 
A key element of the Nordhaus theory-the politician's possibility to build on the 
myopia of the voters who discount future tax payments too much-received considerable 
attention recently in explaining populist behavior of South American  government^.^^ The 
same considerations are relevant for the Soviet Union today, since "glasnost" and the 
transformation away from an authoritarian system raised expectations, and lowered the 
voter's time preference rate. This gives a bias towards short-term policies. 
In the Soviet Union, drastically increased social expenditures is the main expendi- 
ture item preventing budgetary balance.92 The figures are impressive: average annual 
expenditure for new social programs in 1985-89 totalled about 3 billion rubles. In 1990 it 
assee Mueller (1978)) Ch.8 for discussion of Niskanen's 1971 model 
89See Oliveira/Velloso (1991), p.25. 
"See Mueller (1978)) Ch.6. 
"See Dornbusch/Edwards (1990). 
'=See Ofer (1990)) p.311. 
climbed up to 16 billion rubles, and for 1991 more than 90 billion rubles are envisaged,93 
on the federal level alone 65 billion.94 The upsurge of popular demands in the social area 
is a common feature in the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.95 
Furthermore, they have to be seen in perspective: soviet pensions and other social ben- 
efits were small before LLperestroika", and most of the new benefits seem reasonable in a 
Western economy at a similar level of development. Given the acute crisis in the Soviet 
economy, however, they are out of touch with economic reality. 
The situation is greatly aggravated by the struggle between jurisdictions for recognition 
from the constituents. Union republics and the center keep on promising more and more 
generous social programs and end up outstripping the current financial possibilities of the 
Soviet Union by far. One example for that is the Pension Law legislation: in May 1990, 
the federal level enacted a pension reform law which provides a considerable expansion of 
benefits, including indexation, and without tightening eligibility requirements. Although 
this program was already beyond the financial means of the country, in September 1990 
the Russian parliament started discussing a republican law on pensions, and in the heat of 
political rivalry Russia picked up the glove and announced a still more ambitious program 
which increased expenditure on pensions by an additional 15 billion rubles.96 
2.3  DECENTRALIZATION, DISCRETION, A N D  SOFT-BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS 
2.3.1 Economic Incentives and Decentral izat ion 
So far we have primarily been dealing with interactions within the government block. This 
section addresses the question of incentive effects of the Soviet fiscal system on individual 
economic behavior, which is also of prime importance, especially in the context of an 
economy in transition from a planned to a market system. To this end, the Soviet fiscal 
decentralization is analyzed using the concepts of credibility and rules versus discretion. 
The notion of credibility is directly related to the long-term incentive effect of a system. 
The idea is applied by a number of theories which look at the interaction of policymakers 
and private agents. The basic setting is that the behavior of rational, forward~looking 
agents depends on expected policy actions. This implies that decisions taken by the policy- 
maker have an influence, positive or negative, on private efforts. This consideration gains 
importance if policy-makers have the possibility to make discretionary decisions due to 
informational/observance inefficiencies which are at the heart of the positive theory of 
fiscal federalism. With forward looking agents, the policy-maker will optimally try to 
enact a policy program which does not frustrate the private agent's incentives, neither 
today nor in the long-run. The crucial question is under what circumstances will the 
private agents believe what the policy-maker announces as his future policy? That is, 
when is his announcement credible? Private agents will only believe a time-consistent 
announcement, i.e., they do not have reason to assume that the policy-maker will, contrary 
to his earlier announcement, deviate from the announced policy later. If the announced 
policy is time-inconsistent, private agents will not believe it, and any stimulus on private 
incentives which has been intended by the policy announcement will not materialize. 
93Gaidar (1991), p.12f. 
94Alexashenko (1991a), p.3. 
"See the Brazilian experience, Oliveira/Velloso (1991). 
96As one observer, Gaidar (1991), p.24, put it. 
The problem of time inconsistency arises because the policy-maker can not precommit 
himself to carry out the promised policy action. Thus, there is an advantage of policy 
rules over discretion: a precommitted policy-maker, such as one following policy rules, 
will carry out the policy that is optimal given that it is expected. A policy-maker with 
discretion may under rational expectations be expected to make the short-run optimal 
decisions every time he can. Therefore he gains nothing from his opportunism and on 
average produces a worse outcome than would a policy-maker able to  tie his hands.97 On 
the other hand, instruments a t  the discretion of the policy-maker are most desirable from 
the standpoint of facilitating central macroeconomic management, as their impact on 
demand can be most easily predicted by the federal authorities and their level and timing 
can be adjusted to conjunctural requirements. In particular fiscal instruments should be 
flexible in the sense that authorities have to  possess the ability to  adapt and change the 
rules in a timely manner in response to  evolving circumstances. 
A trade-off exists between the two considerations. Here long-term aspects of incen- 
tive compatibility of government policy are emphasized, implying them t o  be the more 
fundamental in the emerging Soviet market economy. 
2.3.2 Ru les  a n d  Discret ion in Taxat ion  
One "policy rule" which is of prime importance for private incentives is the effective tax 
rate: Litwack (1991) argues that a critical element of the current Soviet dilemma is the 
absence of a dynamic tax scheme which is supported by a long-run commitment, since 
the tax scheme for tomorrow is, in general, at the discretion of some politician. There 
is considerable consensus that a major weakness of tax systems in planned economies is 
their lack of stability and ~er ta in ty , '~  thus, they are entailing a high degree of discretion. 
Until very recently, it was not justified at all to  speak of a taxation system in the Soviet 
Union, rather than a transfer system (see II.A.2). An argument could even be made tha.t 
the former practice of the common-pocket of state enterprises and government rendered 
credibility and commitment issues pointless since the institutional setting was such tha.t 
in no way government announcements of "norms" could be credible." In itself, the 
move towards a market economy should undermine the Soviet government's implicit tax 
collecting ability, and reduce thereby problems of discretion. 
Nevertheless, Litwack sees both less administrative planning and more serious prob- 
lems of commitment leading to  an increased budget deficit.''' His argument is primarily 
based on the fact that the rate of which one piece of legislation supplants the next has 
greatly increased, pointing at the huge number of laws, decrees and regulations which 
ha.ve been enacted during the last three years. But it is not obvious how even this partly 
deregulated economy facing many tax legislative acts could possibly do worse, from an 
incentive point of view, than the former common pocket practice. 
To the extent the fall in tax revenues is simply due to  less central power to squeeze 
out enterprises, the picture of the "bargaining economy" (Aven 1991), instead of long- 
run incentive questions, seems more applicable. Despite this, Litwack's point that a high 
frequency of ad hoc changes in tax rules can disrupt credibility, and therefore has long-run 
incentive effects is relevant with respect to  the emerging private sector (co~peratives). '~'  
9 7 ~ l a n c h a r d / ~ i s c h e r  (1989), Ch.11.4; see also here for a more complete discussion. 
g80wens (1990), p.8. 
"Litwack (1991), p.262, wonders, however, why in the "stable" Brezhnev era long-run  commitment,^ 
were not credible. 
100~ i twack  (1991), p.259. 
'OILitwack (1991), p.267. 
Apart from that an argument of increased discretion has to rely instead on the in- 
creased number of involved politicians and bureaucrats on different government levels: the 
fiscal decentralization has led to more, not less administrative planning, thereby partly 
offsetting the reduced problem of discretion due to the emergence of a market economy. 
2.3.3 Discretion, Corruption and Soft-Budget Constraints 
We argue that fiscal decentralization has led to an aggravated discretion problem. This is 
not the same as suggesting that the fiscal legislation of the republics is intentionally less 
transparent and objective than the federal-which does, at least as a general statement, 
not hold.'02 
Instead, the argument is based on the influence of subnational bureaucrats and politi- 
cians: often these agents realize that they have nothing to gain from a shift to a market 
economy, thus they are simply trying to put their control in place of Mos~ow's . '~~ This 
has happened in the case of the income tax legislation of 1991: the Executive Committee 
of Regional and Local Soviets may grant partial or complete exemption for a certain type 
of income or class of taxpayers, and even to a particular taxpayer.'04 Overall corruption 
has increased a lot since the controlling function of subnational parliaments is still in its 
infancy.'05 
But given that state enterprises are still the main source of tax revenue for all govern- 
ment levels, the influence of fiscal decentralization in this area is decisive. There are two 
important mechanisms of how bureaucratic discretion works here: 
(1) The amount of tax transferred to the budget is determined after observing the 
performance of the enterprise. But enterprises do not at all benefit from fiscal 
decentralization, because now they are tied to both the industrial branch (central 
ministry) and the territory (local government and party organs) and depend on both 
to one degree or another.'06 In some cases, control and surveillance has increased 
due to subnational competence to an degree such that protection for enterprises 
against despotic behavior of subnational politicians has been called for. lo7 
Furthermore, the recent experience in China showed that fiscal decentralization ca,n 
significantly increase the problems of discretion and corruption.'08 Local govern- 
ments gave a very generous tax treatment to enterprises within their jurisdiction- 
which reduced tax revenue which was subject to sharing arrangements with the 
center-but relied increasingly on case-by-case negotiated voluntary contributions 
by the enterprises for local projects. 
(2) Poorly performing enterprises are typically bailed-out. Therefore, in order to con- 
serve and use its discretionary powers, bureaucracies must keep the budget con- 
straints of enterprises soft. In some cases, the obstacles of creating hard-budget 
constraints have increased after subnational bureaucracies collude with central bu- 
reaucracies: in the Soviet Union, both federal and Russian authorities insist on the 
102For instance, the tax system of Estonia is much more explicit than the current union legislation, dis- 
tinguishing gross and net household income. Also, the RSFSR has only one rate on return on expenditure, 
not a multiplicity, as the union legislation; Kommersant, February 1991. 
lo3See Alexashenko (1990), p.36. 
lo41MF, et.a1.(1991), Vol.1, p.251. 
lo5See KnightIWaxman (1991), p.25. 
'06Litwack (1991), p.272f; 
lo7see Alexashenko (1990), p.24. 
'''See Blejer/Szapary (1989), p.20f. 
Table 6: The Soviet State Budget, 1987-1991 (In billion rubles) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1990" 1991b 
Total Revenue 360.1 365.1 384.9 452.0 n/a 300.0 
(Percent of GDP) (43.6) (41.7) (41.0) (47.2) (31.1) 
Total Expenditure 429.3 445.9 465.1 510.1 n/a 580.0 
(Percent of GDP) (52.0) (51.0) (49.5) (53.2) n /a  (60.1) 
Total Deficit 69.2 80.8 80.2 58.1 80.0 280.0 
(Percent of GDP) (8.4) (9.2) (8.5) (6.1) (8.0) (29.0) 
Sources: For 1987-1989 Official Data from USSR Ministry of Finance, Goskomstat, and es- 
timates; IMF et.d.(1991), Vol.1, p.54f.; For 1990 Goskomstat, USSR State Committee Press 
Release No.155, May 22, 1991; 
aEstimates by Aslund (1991), p.34; based on Yasin, Y ., and Alexashenko, S., "Drama byudzheta," 
Izvestia, December 30, 1990; 
estimates, based PlanEcon Report (1991), No.17, May 16, 1991; Soviet press releases until August 
1991, Report on the USSR (1991). 
creation of a special bank which function it is to give soft credits to enterprises, 
thereby preserving their soft-budget c o n ~ t r a i n t . ' ~ ~  
Thus, evidence collected so far indicates that for Public Choice reasons decentral- 
ization might well be detrimental to the creation of a non-discretionary Soviet fiscal 
system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Soviet Fiscal Federalism, both in normative and positive terms, sug- 
gests the move towards decentralization to be accompanied with less fiscal stability. In- 
deed, over the last few months the Soviet fiscal stance worsened dramatically, see Table 6. 
The figure of 280 billion rubles (nominal prices) presented for 1991 is a prediction based 
on current trends in GDP, tax revenue and spending in the Soviet Union. USSR Minister 
of Finance V.Orlov expected that the total budget deficit could rise to  280-300 billion 
rubles by the end of the year, which is about 30% of GDP.ll0 By any measure, the budget 
deficit in the Soviet Union is huge. But how can one argue that the decentralization of 
fiscal decision-making power to  the Union republics aggravated the Soviet fiscal stance 
when most impulses to  further reform to a market system come increasingly from the 
republican side, not from the federal level? 
Three things must be noted: firstly, the general development of disintegration in the 
Soviet economy has to be taken into account: The republics are, at least partially, pur- 
suing their goal of economic and political independence with the use of fiscal policies. 
This has clearly led to a certain degree of Overshooting, as, for instance, happened in the 
case of tax-legislative competition with the federal level. Secondly, our discussion above 
showed that the most important effects stem from the fact that the current fiscal system 
is a non-system, i.e., it still lacks objective, stable and enforcable rules for intergovern- 
mental relations. Therefore, any impact of fiscally independent Union republics which 
10gAlexashenko (1990), p.20f. 
"'Radio Mayak, July 4, 1991; Report on the USSR, July 12, 1991, p.32; Khanin (1991) guesstimates a 
total deficit of 328 billion rubles for 1991, see Hanson (1991), p.2. 
would-presumably at least partially-follow a fiscal policy more conducive to stability is 
still dominated by the chaos in the current fiscal system. In Brazil, the same transitional 
situation has led the head of the International Monetary Fund's advising delegation, Faj- 
genbaum, to call even for changes in the constitution to clarify resp~nsibilities.~~' Today's 
situation is, due to uncertainties about rules and lack of coordination, likely to be more 
detrimental to fiscal stability than the former centralized system or fiscally independent 
Union republics, which would mainly have to deal with coordination questions. Thirdly, 
as especially the positive approach points out, it is necessary to distinguish between in- 
tended fiscal policies and the actual outcome in the Union republics: for this year one 
estimate attributes about 62% of the total budget deficit to the republics, 37% to the Rus- 
sian republic alone.l12 Also, the joint effect of disintegration and step-by-step enterprise 
liberalization and reform requires future research, given that most enterprises are still 
state owned. This factor is a central one in assessing the future course of transition to a 
market economy when the Union republics will be reforming their economies individually. 
"'The Guardian, July 24, 1991, p.11; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, July 26,1991, p.10; Der Standard (Wien), 
July 23, 1991, p.16. 
112203 and 120 billion rubles, resp. in absolute terms, Khanin (1991). 
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